

GREENWOOD HIGH
JUNIOR MODEL UNITED NATIONS

BACKGROUND GUIDE



UNSC

AGENDA

ADDRESSING THE RISE OF VIOLENT
EXTREMIST ACTIVITY AND
INSTABILITY IN THE SAHEL REGION

Letter from the Executive Board

Welcome to the United Nations Security Council,

As your Executive Board for this conference, it is our privilege to be able to assist you through this multifaceted and complex committee. The UNSC serves as a defender of peace, security and justice in the world today. Members deliberate on the most prominent issues which plague our world and exercise unimaginable amounts of power.

MUNs hold a special place in many of our hearts as it helps us grow; the conference room becomes a space where ideas are challenged and fiery speeches are orated. Through rigorous debate and collaboration, delegates learn not only the art of diplomacy, but also to think on their feet and become more confident.

Our primary goal is to create an environment that enables this growth. We aim to ensure that committee proceedings are intellectually stimulating, respectful, and inclusive, while also challenging you to push the boundaries of your abilities.

The agenda before you- *the crisis in the Sabel region- is one of immense complexity and urgency.*

The region stands at the crossroads of political instability, terrorism, and humanitarian crises. As members of the United Nations Security Council, you are entrusted with the responsibility of addressing these challenges through diplomacy, cooperation, and decisive action.

We hope this background guide will be informative and comprehensive. If you have any doubts please do reach out to us.

Vice Chairperson: Neil Akhawat (neil@isecol.com)

Moderator: Tarun Chetan (tarun.chethan@gmail.com)

Introduction to Committee

The UNSC is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, it is entrusted with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. The UNSC was established under the Charter of the United Nations after the devastation of WW2. What makes the UNSC stand out is its ability to make legally binding decisions - especially while responding to crises and ensuring that threats to peace are addressed swiftly.

The Security Council comprises 15 member states: five permanent members (P5) and ten nonpermanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. The P5 holds special privileges, including the power of veto, which allows any one of them to block the adoption of substantive resolutions, regardless of the majority's opinion. This arrangement, while reflective of post-war power structures, continues to spark debate over fairness, representation, and effectiveness in addressing contemporary global challenges.

The UNSC's responsibilities include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, imposition of sanctions, authorization of the use of force, and the referral of cases to international judicial bodies like the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Council also plays a significant role in conflict mediation, post-conflict reconstruction, and the promotion of diplomatic solutions. Resolutions adopted by the UNSC are binding on all member states, giving the Council an authoritative and consequential voice in global governance.

Chapter 5 of the UN Charter entrusts the UNSC with taking action to maintain international peace and security (Article 24), making decisions that all member states must comply to (Article 39), recommend or decide on actions taken on threats to peace using sanctions, intervention and other actions (Article 39), investigate situations that may cause international turmoil (Article 34), authorize military activity by member states (Article 43), and finally, encourage peaceful resolutions of conflicts (Article 33).

Overview / Introduction to the Agenda

Over the past two decades, the Sahel region of Africa has become one of the most fragile and unstable security regions in the world. The Sahel stretches across West and Central Africa and includes countries such as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and parts of Nigeria. It lies between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa and is also along important trade and migration routes. This region has been facing several problems, such as weak governance, poverty, climate change, and unresolved political grievances, which have gradually weakened state authority in many Sahelian countries. As a result, violent extremist (NSAs) activity and armed instability have expanded across the region.

The erosion of state authority in the Sahel did not happen suddenly. It developed over many years due to poor governance, corruption, limited government presence in rural areas, and repeated unconstitutional changes of government. In several countries, the state has been unable to effectively control large areas of its territory or provide basic services such as security, justice, healthcare, and education. As public trust in governments declined, other actors began to fill this gap, including community militias, criminal networks, and non-state armed actors.

At the same time, violent extremist activity has increased across the Sahel. Non-state armed actors operate across borders and heavily exploit of local grievances, inter-communal tensions, and economic desperation to gain more fighters and expand their influence. Attacks against civilians, security forces, humanitarian workers, and state institutions have become more frequent. This violence has caused large-scale displacement, food insecurity, and serious humanitarian crises. Instability due to violence in one country has repeatedly spread to neighbouring states, turning the Sahel Crisis, a regional threat that is spread across several countries, rather than a national threat.

International involvement in the Sahel has expanded in response to these developments. Regional organizations, United Nations peacekeeping missions, and foreign military partners have sought to assist Sahelian governments in restoring security and governance. However, foreign interventions, military withdrawals, and shifting alliances have also reshaped the security landscape, sometimes creating new power vacuums. In recent years, due to political instability and military takeovers in key Sahelian states, international cooperation has further complicated and weakened regional security.

Timeline / History of the Sahel Crisis

1960: Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and other Sahelian nations become independent of colonial rule. Weak institutions, inadequate infrastructure, inadequately trained security personnel, and borders that cross ethnic and tribal communities are all inherited by new administrations. With minimal presence in rural and northern areas, state power is still concentrated in capital cities.

1970–1985: The Sahel experienced repeated droughts, including the 1972–74 and 1983–85 droughts, which killed over 100,000 people and affected more than 50 million across Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso (Wikipedia contributors, 2025). Livestock losses exceeded 40% in some regions, destroying pastoral livelihoods. Governments lacked early-warning systems and relief capacity, accelerating rural poverty and weakening public trust in state institutions.

1990–1996: Marginalized communities demanding political inclusion and development lead to armed uprisings in northern Mali and Niger. Instead of long-term political solutions, governments mostly use military force in response. Grievances remain unresolved when peace agreements are signed but poorly carried out. Central governments and peripheral regions become permanently divided as a result.

2001–2006:

The Sahel received more attention as part of international counter-extremism strategies following the 9/11 attacks. The United States expanded military training, intelligence sharing, and security cooperation through initiatives such as the Pan-Sahel Initiative and later the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which provided security assistance to over 10 African states, including Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso (U.S. Department of State, 2006). France maintained significant military and political influence due to its historical ties with former colonies. During this period, security assistance increased substantially, while governance reform, justice systems, and socioeconomic development received comparatively limited funding, allowing institutional weaknesses and public grievances to persist.

2011:

Following the collapse of Libya, an estimated tens of thousands of weapons, including heavy arms and ammunition, flowed into the Sahel from unsecured Libyan stockpiles (United Nations Security Council [UNSC], 2012). Former combatants returned to Mali and Niger with advanced weapons, while national armies lacked the capacity to control borders spanning thousands of kilometers. This uncontrolled proliferation significantly strengthened non-state armed actors and increased regional instability.

2012: Large portions of northern Mali were taken over by armed groups, covering nearly two-thirds of the country's territory. The Malian army collapsed in the north due to poor training, low morale, and inadequate equipment. A military coup in Bamako further weakened the central government, marking the first time a Sahelian state lost sustained territorial control on such a scale (Lawal, 2024).

2013: France launched a military intervention at Mali's request under Operation Serval, deploying approximately 4,000 troops to stop armed groups advancing toward southern Mali (Wikipedia contributors, 2025b). Armed groups were pushed out of major cities but retreated into rural and border regions. The United Nations established MINUSMA, which became one of the UN's largest and deadliest peacekeeping missions, with over 15,000 personnel at its peak (Orr, 2023). Despite this support, long-term insecurity remained.

2014–2016: Violent extremist activity spread from Mali into Burkina Faso and Niger. Reported attacks against civilians increased by more than 250% during this period, according to conflict event data (*Violent Extremism in the Sahel | Global Conflict Tracker*, n.d.). France expanded its military presence through Operation Barkhane, operating across five Sahel states. The crisis shifted from a national conflict to a regional security threat.

2017: Sahelian states established the G5 Sahel Joint Force, aiming to deploy 5,000 troops for cross-border operations (*Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force: Closed Consultations*, n.d.). However, chronic funding shortages, limited coordination, and logistical constraints reduced effectiveness. Non-state armed actors adapted by increasing mobility and attacks on civilian targets.

2020: The Malian military removed the elected government, citing corruption and worsening insecurity. By this time, Mali had recorded over 1,000 conflict-related deaths annually (Africa Center, 2025). International partners raised concerns over democratic backsliding, while political instability further weakened public trust and state authority.

2021: Mali's military leadership consolidated power and reduced cooperation with Western partners. France announced the drawdown of its forces, while Mali expanded security partnerships with Russia. This marked a clear shift in foreign engagement away from Western states toward alternative security actors.

2022: Burkina Faso experienced two military takeovers in one year, with authorities justifying their actions by pointing to rising insecurity. Civilian deaths in Burkina Faso increased by over 50% compared to 2021, particularly in rural regions (Africa Center, 2023). Military governance became dominant across much of the Sahel.

2023: The military overthrew Niger's elected government, prompting ECOWAS to threaten intervention. Niger had previously been a key security partner, hosting over 1,000 foreign military personnel (Ghanem, 2024). Following the coup, several international partners suspended cooperation, and the United Nations ended MINUSMA's mandate, formally withdrawing by the end of the year.

2024: Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso established a joint security coalition, announcing plans for collective defense. Despite this, over *6 million people across the Sahel required humanitarian assistance*, and civilian displacement continued to rise (*2024 Sahel Humanitarian Needs and Requirements Overview*, 2024). State authority remained weak in vast rural areas, with the Sahel continuing to pose a serious threat to regional and international peace.



Case Studies:

China

China's involvement in the Sahel focuses mainly on economic and diplomatic efforts instead of military actions. China views the region as important due to the abundance of resources, infrastructure needs, and political influence in Africa. Chinese companies and state banks have funded in roads, railways, power plants, and government buildings in Sahelian countries. While these projects improve the infrastructure, they are funded through loans from China, which the governments find hard to pay back due to the political instability. This situation adds pressure on the already weak state government, weakens the trust of the public, and raises concerns about debt dependency.

China also sends troops and specialists to United Nations peacekeeping missions, including MINUSMA in Mali, where its people concentrate on engineering, logistics, and medical support. Between 2000 and 2020, China committed over *USD 20 billion* in loans and infrastructure investments across Sahel and neighbouring West African states, mainly through state-owned banks (Admin, 2025). Politically, China engages with both official governments and military-led organizations, emphasizing the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference. Overall, China portrays itself as a development partner while gaining long-term strategic influence in the Sahelian Region.

United States of America

After the 9/11 attacks, the US became more involved in the Sahel because it saw regional instability as a threat to international security. Instead of taking part in direct combat, its strategy concentrated on combating violent extremism through military training, intelligence sharing, and surveillance. Through AFRICOM and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, the United States worked with regional forces and built strategic facilities like Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger.

The United States trained national armies in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger even though it did not participate in direct combat. However, there were worries about unanticipated consequences because a number of officers who went on to lead military coups had previously received training in the United States. Between 2005 and 2018, the United States spent *over USD 1 billion* on security assistance in the Sahel under counterterrorism programs (Zhu & Gao, 2024). The United States suspended security cooperation and reevaluated its presence in Niger following the unconstitutional change of government in 2023.

France

Because of its historical links to former colonies, France has been heavily involved in the Sahel. When it started Operation Serval in Mali in 2013 to stop armed groups from moving closer to the capital, its involvement grew more intense. Later, this developed into Operation Barkhane, a regional military operation involving Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali in which France served as the main external security partner. At its peak, Operation Barkhane deployed *around 5,100 French troops* across the Sahel (*France's Action in the Sahel*, 2021).

France's extensive military presence grew increasingly unpopular over time. Many citizens accused France of prioritizing its own strategic interests, weakening sovereignty, and failing to restore security. French forces were driven out after military takeovers in Burkina Faso and Mali, which resulted in a complete withdrawal. Although France does not provide training to non-state armed actors, security gaps and the deterioration of state authority were accelerated by the breakdown of state authority.

United Kingdom

The majority of the UK's involvement in the Sahel was supportive and cooperative. With an emphasis on surveillance and civilian protection rather than direct combat, the UK provided troops, helicopters, and intelligence capabilities to the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA. London continuously supported French-led projects and worked through the UN. The UK deployed approximately *300 troops* and three Chinook helicopters to MINUSMA between 2020 and 2023 (Afp & Afp, 2022).

The UK withdrew its forces from Mali in 2023 after the country's transitional government limited foreign deployments and UN operations. Beyond security, Britain offered humanitarian aid, assistance for development, and support for governance with an objective of tackling the root causes of instability in the region.

Russia

After 2020, Russia's power in the Sahel grew, particularly as the Western military left. Moscow has presented itself as a feasible security partner that does not impose democratic or governance-related political requirements. The Wagner Group, which was invited by transitional authorities in Mali and later Burkina Faso, was one of the private military actors who played a major role in Russian involvement.

Joint operations involving Russian personnel have been connected to violations of international humanitarian law and serious harm to civilians, according to UN experts and human rights organizations. UN investigations documented hundreds of civilian deaths linked to joint operations between Malian forces and Wagner personnel between 2021 and 2023 (Burke, 2023). Although Russia denies aiding non-state armed actors, questions about reliability are raised by unclear security agreements and arms transfers. In terms of politics, Russia reinforced military control over civilian governance by establishing closer ties with military-led administrations that had been closed off by Western nations.

Nigeria

Due to its extensive borders and its own security issues in the Lake Chad Basin, Nigeria is a major regional actor that is greatly impacted by the instability in the Sahel. It has continuously maintained that unconstitutional changes of government worsen regional insecurity and plays a leading role within ECOWAS. Nigeria accepted the threat of collective intervention and vehemently opposed the coup in Niger in 2023.

Nigeria collaborates with its neighbors through intelligence sharing, joint operations, and border surveillance. While exact, real-time percentages fluctuate, Nigeria provides the largest contingent of troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) fighting Boko Haram around Lake Chad (Lenshie et al., 2023). Non-state armed actors can, however, travel freely between Nigeria, Niger, and Mali due to porous borders. Nigeria is unable to stabilize the larger Sahel due to internal security difficulties even though it does not support such groups. It continues to be a key diplomatic body supporting for regional resolutions.

Niger

Formerly regarded as one of the most dependable international security partners, Niger occupies a strategic position in the Sahel. In addition to maintaining foreign military facilities, it worked closely with Western nations to combat violent extremism. Following the unconstitutional change of government in 2023, this drastically changed. Before 2023, Niger hosted over 1,000 foreign military personnel and received hundreds of millions of dollars in annual security assistance (Congress.gov, 2025).

Niger moved closer to partners aligned with Russia after the takeover and discontinued cooperation with France and the United States. Thereafter, there were sanctions and tense relations with ECOWAS. Non-state armed actors increased their operations, particularly in rural areas, as borders became more difficult to control and institutions deteriorated. Niger's situation clearly illustrates how political unrest directly accelerates the breakdown of regional security and state authority.

Key Terminologies:

- Sabel Region – A semi-arid belt across West and Central Africa, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, marked by fragile states and recurring insecurity.
- State Authority – The ability of a government to control its territory, enforce laws, provide services, and maintain public order.
- Erosion of State Authority – The gradual weakening of government control due to poor governance, corruption, insecurity, and loss of public trust.
- Non-State Armed Actors (NSAs) – Organized armed groups that operate independently of state control and use violence to pursue political, ideological, or economic goals.
- Violent Extremist Activity – The use of violence by armed groups to impose ideological beliefs, undermine state institutions, or destabilize societies.
- Unconstitutional Change of Government – The removal of a government through illegal means, such as military coups or forced takeovers.
- Porous Borders – Weakly controlled borders that allow easy movement of people, weapons, and armed groups across countries.
- International Humanitarian Law (IHL) – Legal rules that protect civilians and limit methods of warfare during armed conflicts.
- Civilian Harm – Injury, death, displacement, or suffering experienced by civilians as a result of armed violence.
- Humanitarian Crisis – A situation where large populations lack access to basic needs such as food, water, healthcare, and shelter.
- MINUSMA – The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, established to support security and political stability (ended in 2023).
- ECOWAS – The Economic Community of West African States, a regional body promoting economic integration and political stability.
- Foreign Security Partnerships – Military or security cooperation between states involving training, equipment, or advisory support.
- Peacekeeping Mission – A UN-mandated operation deployed to support ceasefires, protect civilians, and assist political processes.
- Security Vacuum – A situation where the absence of effective security forces allows armed groups to expand influence.
- Transnational Threat – A security risk that crosses national borders and affects multiple countries or regions.
- Debt Dependency – A condition where states rely heavily on external loans, limiting economic independence and governance capacity.
- Governance – The systems and processes through which a state manages public affairs and delivers services.
- Regional Instability – Ongoing insecurity affecting multiple neighboring states, often spreading across borders.

Relevant International Law -

- ECOWAS treaty:
 - Article 3 - Outlines the Aims and Objectives of the agreement
 - Article 4 - Fundamental principles
 - Article 58 - Outlines measures parties should take in order to maintain regional peace
- The ECOWAS protocol on peace and security:
 - Article 10 - Outlines the functions of the institutions developed in the mechanism
 - Article 22 - The role of the ECOMOG
 - Article 25 - Mentions the scope and conditions in which the mechanism may apply.
 - Article 52 - Co-operation with the UN and other regional bodies.
- The Charter of the United Nations:
 - Article 2 - Outlines the purposes and the principles of the UN
 - Article 33 - The peaceful settlement of disputes
 - Articles 41 & 42 - Outlines the means through which the Security Council may enforce its decisions
 - Article 51 - Provides countries with the right to self-defence
 - Chapter 5 of the charter establishes the Security Council, its powers, its roles, and its functions
- African Union Constitutive Act:
 - Article 4 - Outlines the principles of the treaty, including the circumstances in which intervention may take place.
 - Article 23 - Outlines the various forms of sanctions which may be implemented.
- Additional resources:
 - International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
 - The Geneva Conventions
 - The Rome Statute
 - Customary law (including Actus Reus, Mens Reus, Dolus Specialis, etc.)

General Rules of Procedure

Rules of procedure refer to the formal conduct delegates are expected to maintain during the conference. It is essential to adhere to the rules and maintain decorum for the smooth flow of the committee. For this conference, we will be adhering to the UNA-USA format of rules of procedure.

Begin formal session:

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allotted country ” puts forward a motion to begin the formal session.

Roll call:

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allotted country ” raises a motion to begin a roll call.

When your allotted country is called upon during the roll call, you have two options: either say “present and voting” or simply say “present”.

(Note: If a delegate says “ present and voting ”, they cannot abstain from voting on the resolution at the end of committee.)

General Speaker’s list (GSL):

The committee generally begins formal debate by starting the ‘GSL’ (General Speaker’s list). It serves the purpose of allowing a delegate to express their stance on the agenda. A GSL is nonexhaustive.

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allotted country ” raises a motion to establish the general speakers ’ list

Moderated Caucus:

This motion can be raised when the committee wants to debate on a specific topic.

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allotted country ” raises a motion to begin a Moderated Caucus on “ topic ” for a time period of ” x ” minutes allotting “ x ” minute per speaker.

In case a delegate does not get recognized to speak, a delegate can send in your point through substantive chit.

Format of substantive chit:

Substantive chits are written as follows;

TO: The Executive Board (may be abbreviated as EB)

FROM: Delegate of “ your allocated country “

“CONTENT”

Unmoderated Caucus:

This motion is proposed when delegates wish to discuss the committee's status among themselves and further evaluate their next actions.

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allotted country ” raises a motion to move into an Unmoderated Caucus for a time period of “ x ” minutes.

Points:

1) Point of Parliamentary Enquiry:

This point is raised by a delegate to clarify anything regarding the rules of procedure or to know the status of the committee (For example: to know which delegate is speaking next/ if the EB is accepting more speakers)

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allocated country ” raises a point of a parliamentary inquiry.

2) Point of Personal Privilege:

This point is raised by a delegate to address a personal issue. (For example: to ask another delegate to repeat a point they made in their speech/to be excused from the committee)

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allocated country ” raises a point of personal privilege.

3) Point of Order:

This point can be raised by a delegate to point out logical or factual inaccuracies in the speeches of other delegates.

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allocated country ” raises a point of order, Factual inaccuracy/ Logical Fallacy.

4) Point of Information:

This is raised when a delegate wants to ask questions about another delegate's speech.

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allocated country ” raises a point of information.

If you ask a question and are still not satisfied with the answer, you can raise a follow-up question right after the delegate answers.

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allocated country ” wants to raise a follow-up question

(Note: This point can be denied if the Chairperson feels so).

If a delegate wants to ask a question VIA chat, you can use this format :

VIA THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

POINT OF INFORMATION:

TO: Delegate of “ country you want to question ”

FROM: Delegate of “ your allotted country ”

“ State the question ”



Draft Resolution

A draft resolution or resolution, contains all the solutions that committee wants to introduce in the form of a formal document that will be discussed and put to vote in front of the committee. If passed, this acts as a set of suggestions and recommendations to those who agree with it on the issue at hand.

Sponsors are those who have majorly written the resolution, whose countries must agree with every clause and amendment. The number of sponsors is usually kept between 2 and 4, this will be informed to the committee on the day of the conference.

Signatories are those who would like to see the resolution discussed in front of the committee. A signatory does not necessarily agree with the resolution, just wants to see it be debated. A delegate can be a signatory to more than one resolution.

Resolutions must have at least 1/3rd of the committee's strength as signatories to be able to present them to the committee.

An amendment to a resolution is in the form of an edit, addition, or deletion to the resolution that has been presented to the committee. This is usually sent to the chairs after the resolution has been discussed and through a motion, the committee is in an amendment session. If more than 1/3rd the number of a resolution's total number of operative clauses are accepted as amendments, the resolution will be scrapped.

When an amendment is presented to the chairs, the sponsors of the resolution will be given the option to either accept it as friendly or unfriendly. A friendly amendment is automatically accepted, and the content that was aimed to be changed, added or deleted is done as such. An unfriendly amendment means that the committee will vote, to decide whether or not the change shall be made. This is done through a simple majority vote.

1) Introduce the Resolution:

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allotted country ” would like to raise a motion to introduce “ Resolution name “.

2) Raise an Amendment session:

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allotted country ” would like to raise a motion to move into the amendment session for “ Resolution Name ”.

3) Vote on the resolution:

How to raise it? : The delegate of “ your allotted country ” would like to raise a motion to table “ Resolution Name “ for the voting procedure.

Resolution Format:

“Name of resolution “

Sponsors:

Signatories:

Topic: XYZ

Committee name,

“Clauses “

Preambulatory Clauses:

1. Every preambulatory clause ends with a comma (,)

Operative clauses:

1. Every Operative clause ends with a semicolon (;)
2. Every sub-clause to a resolution should end with a comma (,) till and unless it is the last subclause to the main clause, it shall end with a semicolon (;)
3. Every main clause before starting with a sub-clause should have a colon (:)
4. Full stop at the end of the resolution.

Voting:

- Voting is of 2 types, procedural and substantive.
- Procedural voting requires a simple majority, which is set at $50\% + 1$ of committee strength. (For example, if a committee has 100 people, the simple majority is set at 51 votes). Procedural Voting is used in cases such as voting upon motions.
- Substantive voting requires a special majority, which is set at $66\% + 1$ of committee strength. This is primarily used in voting upon a resolution. (For example, if a committee has 100 members, the majority will be set at 67 votes).

Crisis Rules of Procedure:

Since this committee is a semi-crisis committee, delegates will also need to be well versed in handling backroom affairs for the crisis session(s) that will take place over the course of the committee session.

Crisis Updates:

It is a scenario/ simulation of the current situation of the committee and the world built around it. This is done under the discretion of the Executive Board to make sure there is effective and efficient functioning of the committee.

Documents:

The crisis committee moves ahead with 3 major mediums of documents. These will essentially be your sword and shield in the form of curated words that make up a goal/plan.

1. DIRECTIVE:

Directives are written requests which are sent to, read by, approved or denied by the EB and follow a specific format. Directives are your main tool to influence the crisis and lead the committee to a solution. They have to be handwritten[1] . To have the best chance of getting your directives accepted by the backroom they need to be clear, concise and well written.

A directive may be of two types:

- a) *Covert (Secret)*
- b) *Overt (Public)*

How to format it? :

“ TYPE OF DIRECTIVE “

Author: (your country portfolio(s))

Signatories: (the countries with which you are using resources from)

To: The Executive Board

Objective: (What you want to achieve through this directive)

Resources Utilized: (Equipment/Personnel used)

Plan of Action (POA):

“ *Content* “

Tips:

i) Use Phases to separate different sections of your plan to increase readability and professionalism.

ii) Ensure to use images, drawings or diagrams that could support your directive to increase the technical clarity of your directive.

iii) Using bullet points is mandatory. Any directives found using paragraphs will be scrapped. The EB has complete discretion over the passing or failing of a directive. A failed directive brings about no change in the timeline of the committee whereas a passed directive can dynamically change the timeline in favor/against a particular delegate. The EB may also decide to pass only certain parts of a directive.

2. COMMUNIQUES:

Communiqués are messages from the delegate to another country, organization, person or group of people that are not present in committee. These facilitate dialogue with relevant actors in a crisis. Communiqués often include negotiations, threats, and requests for aid or support but are not limited to the above-stated. They are usually utilized when a country whose consent, opinion, or stance on a particular issue is required, but whose representation does not exist in committee.

A Covert Communiqué is of the same nature as a communiqué except that all communication is kept private between the delegate(s) and the recipient(s) involved.

The Executive Board will decide whether the action discussed in the communiqué passes or fails by its discretion.

How to format it? :

VIA THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

From: (Your Country Allocation)

To: (The Country or Portfolio you want to communicate with)

“Content “

Salutations



3. PRESS RELEASE:

Press releases are messages that you want to be publicised and announced to the general public, or the entire committee. It is an effective tool that can be used to declare any information, or divert and misinform committee.

How to format it? :

VIA THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

From:(Your country portfolio)

To: The Executive Board

“Content “

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